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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
A subsidy is classified as potentially environmentally damaging if it is likely to incentivise behaviour that
could be damaging to the environment irrespective of its importance for other policy purposes. Examples
of such subsidies include providing fossil fuels (including diesel, kerosene, fuel oil, and peat) at lower
prices to certain industries and providing fuel allowances to households to alleviate fuel poverty.
While some publicly-funded supports can have important social and economic purposes, they can
have a negative impact on the environment. While the main approach in Ireland to address this has
been to use different excise duties, Ireland also introduced a carbon tax in 2010. The carbon tax is
one of the primary fiscal policy tools used in several countries to reduce human-induced greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. For the first time after the equalisation of its level on all fossil fuels in 2014, the Irish
government increased the carbon tax from C20 per tonne of CO2 to C26 in 2020. It is expected that the
total carbon tax revenues will increase by C100 million in 2020, compared to 2019.
Notwithstanding this, the total budgetary cost of these fossil fuel subsidies, excluding the agriculture-
related ones, was around C2.44 billion in 2014, whereas the government’s total carbon tax collection was
C390.9 million. In other words, the monetary value of environmentally damaging subsidies was over six
times higher than carbon tax revenues. In 2017, the same ratio was slightly higher, since the total value
of subsidies increased by 11.85%, whereas the growth rate of total carbon tax revenues was only 7.7%.
This report analyses the economic and environmental impacts of the removal of eight different fossil
fuel subsidies in Ireland by using the Ireland Economy-Energy-Environment (I3E) model. In addition, a
separate set of scenarios in which the removal of each subsidy is accompanied by a gradual increase in
the level of the carbon tax are run to quantify the combined effects of these policy instruments.
Main Findings
In this subsection, the results of the simultaneous removal of eight different fossil fuel subsidies in
2020, the scenario named ALL, and its extension with an increase in the carbon tax, the scenario named
ALL tax, will be summarised. In the latter scenario, the carbon tax is increased by C6 annually starting
from 2020 and reaches C80 in 2029. In all scenario analysis considered in this report, it should be noted
that it is assumed that the agricultural non-energy, i.e. methane and nitrous oxide, emissions will not
decline and the fossil fuel subsidies for the sector are not removed. Furthermore, it is also assumed that
there will be no change in other environmental policies and all policy variables are constant at their 2014
levels.
• Along the path of scenario ALL, the total level of economy-wide CO2 emissions will be 20.2%
lower in 2030 than its level along the path of business-as-usual. On the other hand, the reductions
in emissions reach 31.3% in 2030 in the scenario of ALL tax.
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• The scenarios of ALL and ALL tax lead to 11.7% and 18.4% reductions in non-ETS emissions,
respectively. The level of non-ETS emissions, on the other hand, will be 49.5% and 38.1% higher
than Ireland’s legally-binding non-ETS emissions targets for 2030, respectively.
• There are sectoral fossil fuel subsidies to lower the cost of production or to secure the supply of
certain commodities for the air and land transportation, electricity and peat production sectors. The
removal of these subsidies affects those respective sectoral outputs negatively, but their impacts on
other sectors are negligible.
• There are also commodity related subsidies to lower the retail prices of certain commodities, in-
cluding auto and marked diesel, kerosene, and fuel oil. The removal of these subsidies affects
all sectors in an adverse manner except the accommodation and hotels, and public administration
sectors. The removal of subsidies on diesel has the highest impacts across the scenarios consid-
ered, and the transportation, electricity production, agriculture, and construction sectors are hit the
hardest regarding sectoral real value-added.
• An increase in carbon tax with the removal of subsidies amplifies the magnitudes of the adverse
sectoral impacts but does not change the affected sectors.
• In the experiments of ALL and ALL tax, the growth rate of real gross domestic product drops
negligibly for the period of 2014-2054. The level of inflation is 1% higher along the path of
ALL tax, compared to business-as-usual.
• The significant impacts on the poorest household groups’ disposable incomes can be restricted if
the fuel allowances of households are excluded from the removal process of fossil fuel subsidies.
In this case, the policy change has slightly progressive impacts on real disposable income and
household welfare.
• The results show that the implementation of other existing measures concerning the cessation of
coal and peat from electricity production and increasing the share of renewables in electricity pro-
duction, electrification of transportation, retrofitting, and the contributions of the agriculture sector
are also important in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
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1 Introduction
The increased emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide and ozone, generate a human-induced (anthropogenic) climate change. Its expected out-
comes are, in addition to increases in temperature, more variability in temperature and precipitation,
increased occurrences of extreme weather events and a rise in sea levels. The exact repercussions of
these climatic changes on economies and societies are ambiguous but are expected to reach a 2% annual
reduction in the global gross domestic product in case of a 2.5◦C increase in temperature (IPCC, 2014).
In accordance with increasing awareness of climate change, the global-scale efforts were initiated by the
Kyoto Protocol (ratified in 1997 and became effective in 2005) to reduce the GHG emissions and the
Paris Agreement (ratified by 195 states and the European Union (EU) in 2015, though the US has started
the formal withdrawal process) to limit the increase in global temperature to 1.5◦C.
After ratifying the Paris Agreement, the EU set its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs): at least 40% reduction in GHG emissions (compared to 1990 levels), at least 32% share for
renewable energy, and at least 32.5% improvement in energy efficiency. Each member state has legally-
binding targets for each of these EU targets for 2020 and 2030. The EU introduced an EU-wide carbon
allowance market, namely the Emissions Trading System (ETS), that covers emissions of international
aviation, industrial processes, and manufacturing combustion to achieve these targets. The ETS works
on a cap-and-trade principle: the unit price of an allowance (one metric tonne of carbon dioxide) is
determined via an auctioning process for the fixed amount of total allowances. As the firms covered by
the ETS increase their ETS emissions, the demand for allowances boosts and therefore the unit price
of allowance increases, as does the cost of production. For those firms not covered by the ETS, some
member states impose another environmental tax, namely the carbon tax, on the energy commodities to
reduce their emissions not covered by the ETS, i.e. non-ETS emissions.1
In compliance with the EU targets, Ireland’s legally-binding emissions reduction target for 2030 is
a 30% decline in non-ETS emissions compared to 2005 levels.2 In order to disincentivise the non-ETS
sectors such as land transportation, residential, and agriculture in fossil fuel consumption, the Irish gov-
ernment introduced the carbon tax on these commodities in 2009. The level of the carbon tax, for the first
time after 2014 where the government equalised its level on all fossil fuels, increased from C20 per tonne
of CO2 to C26 in 2020.3 Such an increase is expected to result in a C100 million rise in the total carbon
tax collection, and around 1.6% increase in the overall excise revenues of the government.
The carbon tax is at the forefront of the discussions regarding environmental policies for three reasons.
Firstly, carbon taxation is the most cost-effective way of reducing emissions (Nordhaus, 1993), despite its
1 A firm is not covered by the ETS either because the sector that the firm operates in is exempted (for instance, the agriculture
sector) or its combustion capacity is lower than the threshold. For more information, see EPA (2018).
2 The other targets for 2020 are 16% of final energy use (all sectors), 10% of energy use in the transport sector, and 12% of
final heat demand must be sourced from renewables.
3 The tax was imposed on solid fuels in 2013 at the level of C10. The government has declared its commitment: the carbon
tax will reach C80 in 2030 by following a gradually increasing pattern (Government of Ireland, 2019).
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regressive impacts on household welfare: poorer households are disproportionally negatively affected.4
Secondly, as an indirect tax on energy commodities, the carbon tax directly affects the commodity prices,
which are the primary driver of behavioural changes. Thirdly, the raised revenue due to the imposition
of, or an increase in, a tax is intended to be used in financing environmental policies.
An increase in the level of the carbon tax affects all fossil fuel prices simultaneously since the tax is
levied as a unit tax per tonne equivalent of carbon in the content of a commodity. In this case, economic
agents are expected to switch their demand from fossil fuels to other energy commodities, mainly elec-
tricity. As the power generation sector is phasing out its fossil fuel demand and increasing the share of
renewable energy sources, the economy-wide emissions will be lower. In addition, attracting individuals
in the usage of public transportation and electrification of transportation (both private and public), and
retrofitting of the existing housing stock to increase the energy efficiency are also important components
of the climate policies.
Notwithstanding this, governments, including the Irish Government, still run fossil fuel subsidy
schemes, which can be damaging to the environment irrespective of their importance for other policy
purposes. The aims of these subsidies are based on the recipients. For instance, sectoral production
subsidies intend to lower the cost of production which, in turn, lowers domestic prices and increases na-
tional firms’ profits and competitiveness in international markets. Commodity-related subsidies decrease
the retail prices of energy commodities via lowering the excise tax burden. Another viable option is
supporting poorer households in lowering their home heating costs. Coady et al. (2019) states that 191
countries have subsidy schemes for fossil fuels and the global monetary value of these subsidies was
6.3% of global gross domestic product (GDP). The authors also mention that the subsidies keep fossil
fuel prices well below their efficient levels determined by supply costs, environmental costs, and revenue
considerations. However, some of these subsidies, especially commodity-related ones, increase energy
consumption and more importantly, they have unintended repercussions on poor households: as the prices
of the energy commodities are lower for all households, richer households who are more inclined to use
energy commodities benefit more relative to poorer households.
In the case of Ireland, the total budgetary cost of fossil fuel subsidies, excluding the agriculture-related
environmentally damaging subsidies, was around C2.44 billion in 2014, whereas the government’s total
carbon tax collection was C390.9 million in the same year. In other words, the monetary value of fossil
fuel subsidies was 6.26 times higher than the tax collection regarding environmental policies. In 2017,
the ratio of fossil fuel subsidies to the total carbon tax revenue was 6.5.
This report analyses the economic and environmental impacts of the removal of eight different fossil
fuel subsidies in Ireland by using the Ireland Economy-Energy-Environment (I3E) model. In the scenario
analyses, the removal of sectoral fossil fuel subsidies is translated into increases in the production tax rates
of the air transportation, peat, electricity production, and land production sectors, whereas the elimination
4 The distributional impacts of an increase in the carbon tax in Ireland have recently been analysed by Bercholz & Roantree
(2019), Tovar Rean˜os & Lynch (2019), and de Bruin et al. (2019). The results imply that, as in other developed countries, an
increase in the carbon tax has regressive impacts on household disposable income and welfare in Ireland, in the absence of
appropriate policy design.
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of subsidies on the energy commodity is introduced as increases in the sales tax rates of diesel (auto
and marked), fuel oil and kerosene. The removal of household energy allowances (the sum of means-
tested allowances for electricity, gas, and fuel) is treated as a decline in the total government transfers to
households. However, since these allowances are received by the poorest households who are on welfare,
the shares of the poorest two households groups in urban and rural areas are reduced.
The results reveal that removing subsidies one-by-one does not generate a significant decrease in the
overall economic activity measured by real (in 2014 prices) GDP in 2030. The impacts on real investment
expenditure are slightly higher than that of real GDP, whereas there are improvements in the net exports-
to- and debt-to-GDP ratios, again at negligible levels. The inflation, household real disposable income
and welfare impacts are also minimal. Even if all subsidies are removed simultaneously, real GDP will be
only 1.3% lower in 2030, compared to its business-as-usual (BaU) level, which lowers the long-run (for
the period 2014-2054) annual average economic growth rate by only 0.027 percentage points compared to
its historical long-run growth rate (3.3%). The decline in real investment expenditure and thus, the capital
accumulation is in line with the impacts on real GDP, but the improvements in the net exports-to- and
debt-to-GDP ratios are stronger. Overall inflation increases insignificantly, whereas household dispos-
able income and welfare deteriorate, especially for the poorest two household groups in both urban and
rural areas. The exclusion of the household allowances from the removal of all fossil fuel subsidies has
limited impacts on the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts, whereas it prevents the poorest households
from being strictly worse off. In this case, all households are getting worse off, and the impacts across
households are n-shaped and slightly progressive in both areas of residence. If the government introduces
a more ambitious policy change by accompanying the removal of all subsidies in 2020 by following a
gradually increasing trajectory for the level of the carbon tax, the annual average growth rate declines by
0.04 percentage points relative to its historical level. The inflationary and disposable income effects be-
come larger, compared to no increase in the carbon tax scenario, but impacts are small. As in the previous
case, excluding the households’ allowances from the removal process saves the poorest households from
falling into a worse off situation.
In addition to their negligible impacts on the overall macroeconomic environment, the removal of
all subsidies and increasing the carbon tax does not help Ireland to meet its 2030 non-ETS emission
targets: compared to the target of a 30% reduction in emissions in 2030, the level of emissions will
be 38.1% higher than its 2005 level. It should be noted that in these scenario analyses, the other climate
policies such as electrification of transportation and increasing energy efficiency as well as the agricultural
methane and nitrous oxide emissions are assumed not to change during the model horizon. In that respect,
the results should be interpreted cautiously: the removal of fossil fuel subsidies and the taxation of carbon
can be just a part of a set of policies to achieve the environmental targets.
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the variety of fossil fuel subsidies in dif-
ferent countries and summarises the fossil fuel subsidies in the Irish economy. Section 3 provides the
related literature. Section 4 describes the technical details of the I3E model, and Section 5 describes the
experiments which are run in the model. The results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Fossil Fuel Subsidies
This section emphasises the scale of fossil fuel subsidies worldwide. We firstly look at the different types
of subsidies available in the wider EU and further afield, before secondly outlining in detail the subsidies
in the Irish economy which have been modelled for this report.
There are two different definitions for calculating fossil fuel subsidies in an economy, used by both the
OECD and the CSO. First is the “budgetary transfers”, which is a direct accounting of funding which is
made available to enterprises from (in our case) a national budget. Second is the “tax expenditures”, which
is a relative measure indicating a preferential treatment of fossil fuels in the fiscal structure, assessed
against a benchmark tax level for other activities and sectors within each country (OECD, 2018).
2.1 Global Context
There have been reasonable global efforts to phase out damaging fossil fuel subsidies over the last decade
or so. In 2009, the G20 emphasised its commitment to “rationalise and phase out over the medium term
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption”.5 However, the active response has
tended not to have matched the vocal support. Indeed, Coady et al. (2019) suggests that estimates of
global fossil fuel subsidies in 2017 exceeded US$5 trillion, an increase from the 2015 level of US$4.7
trillion. The paper contends that relatively large economic and environmental benefits could have been
Figure 1: Fossil Fuel Subsidies by Country in 2017, percentage of GDP
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD and CSO data on fossil fuel subsidies
5 G20 Leaders Statement from the Pittsburgh Summit, September 2009. Accessed here: https://bit.ly/371qWao.
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realised had fuel pricing been set efficiently. For example, in 2015, global carbon emissions could have
decreased by 28%, and government revenue could have increased by 3.8% of GDP.
This section places the extent of Irish fossil fuel subsidies in a global context, by outlining the fossil
fuel support schemes in place in various European and non-European countries. It further highlights
any steps that have been taken to phase out these environmentally damaging subsidies. To provide a
comparison, a summary of the total fossil fuel subsidies to GDP6 ratio, in the distinction of budgetary
transfers and tax expenditures, for selected countries in 2017 is given in Figure 1.7
For the tax expenditures method (which represents the largest method of subsidising fossil fuels),
Ireland has the second-highest level of fossil fuel subsidies after Finland, when measured as a percentage
of GDP (0.75% vs 0.77%). Ireland is followed by Italy (0.57%), Belgium (0.56%), the UK (0.46%) and
Australia (0.46%). Note, however, that given the variation in fiscal systems and accounting methods in
each country, a direct comparison of this measure should be made with a degree of caution.
2.1.1 Subsidies in Europe
We provide a brief overview of the varying systems of fossil fuel subsidies in selected European countries.
In many cases, the majority of the supports relate to reductions on fuel prices and excise rates, though
other country-specific budgetary schemes are also in operation.
The United Kingdom (UK) has a substantial fiscal support structure for fossil fuel subsidies. Over
C1.7 billion budgetary transfer is attributed to aid for the coal industry to protect from inherited liabilities,
intended to avoid placing a significant burden on the industry. Tax-related subsidies are also numerous
and cover value-added tax (VAT) relief and excise rate relief and reductions. The largest of these, totalling
over C4 billion, is a reduced VAT rate scheme for natural gas. Fuel oils are exempted from excise duty if
those oils are not used as fuel in motors, machinery or heat, while income tax relief related to first-year
capital allowances for corporations accumulates to over C1 billion.
While Germany tends to be a pioneer in climate-change reduction policies, a range of fossil fuel
subsidies is still available in the German economy. Over C230 million was made available in the budget
for compensation related to the closure of lignite-fired power plants. Other existing subsidies include,
among others, tax breaks for the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, energy tax exemption for aviation-
related fuel consumption and energy tax relief for energy-intensive industries. In France, in addition to
excise rate and energy tax exemptions, there are also support structures in place related to overseas VAT
exemption and taxi-drivers. These measures are also existent in the Spanish economy, and Spain also
maintains financial supports for electricity generation from non-renewable sources, as well as giving aid
to coal and oil producers to help the production in those sectors.
Even Sweden, in spite of its credible global track record with regards to environmental protection, still
maintains a large fossil fuel support structure, in excess of C1 billion (converted from Swedish krona).
6 GDP data sourced from the UN database https://bit.ly/33QEv9H.
7 This data is retrieved from the OECD database on fossil fuel supports, available at https://bit.ly/36XSFJ0. It is provided
on a per annum basis. In the case of Ireland, however, more comprehensive CSO data are used.
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The two largest contributors to this total are the tax exemption on biofuels and the reduced energy tax
rate for diesel used in motor vehicles. Other significant subsidies include tax exemptions (both energy
and CO2 taxes) for aviation, delivery shipping and mining.
Finland has similar GHG emissions statistics (around 60 million tonnes of CO2-eq) and EU binding
targets as those of Ireland, as well as a comparable fossil fuel support structure to Ireland. Support is
available for the storage of peat, and there are energy tax reductions for diesel, peat and light fuel oil, and
carbon tax reductions are available to heat and power-producing sectors. Moreover, there is a wider tax
refund available to energy-intensive industries, for their consumption of oil, electricity, gas, etc.
2.1.2 Subsidies Outside of Europe
Fossil fuel subsidies also play a central role in the economies of non-EU countries, again primarily in
the form of excise rate reductions. In Australia, large contributors to fossil fuel supports include reduced
excise rates on fuel and a Fuel Tax Credits System, totalling over C5 billion, which is akin to other diesel
rebate schemes noted in Europe. For China, over 65 billion Chinese Yuan was allocated to groups most
affected by the Petroleum Fuel Prices Reform. Elsewhere, tax rebates and exemptions make up the largest
portion of tax supports. Reduced excise rates on aviation fuel and a rebate on imported natural gas, for
example, save industries billions of Yuan a year. These excise rate reductions are also common in India,
with customs duties reductions on oil, and tax reductions on fuels as “declared goods”. Canada’s fiscal
system is comparatively less favourable to fossil fuels, with C5.5 million accounted for in the OECD data
as available tax breaks. Japan is also less supportive of fossil fuel-consuming schemes with most of its
largest subsidies relating to overseas oil exploration.
2.2 The Case of Ireland
In this section, we provide a brief description of the different fossil subsidies which have been incor-
porated into the I3E model. The first set of subsidies refers to those which are directly damaging to
the environment, while the second set details those modelled subsidies which are indirectly damaging.
For modelling purposes, we only consider the eight most significant fossil fuel subsidies in Ireland.8
Nonetheless, the chosen subsidies represent a substantial proportion of all that are in the economy. The
CSO calculates that there were around C4.2 billion worth of environmentally damaging fossil fuel sub-
sidies available in the Irish economy in 2014. Of this, C1.8 billion were agricultural subsidies, which we
do not include in our model as these are not fossil fuel-related. Therefore, of the subsidies included in
our model, we cover approximately 96% of all fossil fuel subsidies in the Irish economy in 2014.9
8 The types and monetary costs of the other subsidies are available in CSO (2018).
9 The figures provided refer to 2014 values of fossil fuel subsidies, since these are the values used to calibrate the model. For
reference, the total cost of environmentally damaging subsidies in 2017 (the latest available data) was C4.15 billion, of which
C1.4 billion was agricultural subsidies.
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2.2.1 Directly Damaging Fossil Fuel Subsidies
These are supports for fossil fuel usage in general, and their total cost in 2014 was C0.62 billion. The
largest of these, the fuel allowance, is a government subsidy afforded to welfare-dependent households
to heat their homes during winter. Similarly, the electricity, gas and heating allowances are part of a
Households Benefits Package, available to anyone over the age of 70, and certain households under that
age. In these cases, a cash credit of C35 is applied to the individual’s monthly energy bill (DEASP,
2018). In 2014, approximately C175 million was spent on such allowances.
The Public Service Obligation (PSO) Levy is a flat monthly standing VAT-inclusive charge, aimed at
promoting renewable energy, which is applied to electricity users. The proceeds of the levy are subse-
quently distributed to energy producers to subsidise any shortfall in the price which is charged to con-
sumers and the international market price of energy. In 2014, this amounted to C3.57 for domestic
consumers, and C10.82 for small commercial consumers respectively (CER, 2013). Around C223 mil-
lion was spent on the PSO Levy in 2014, C119 million of which was used to subsidise peat production,
although this scheme will be ceased by the end of 2019.10
2.2.2 Indirectly Damaging Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Indirectly damaging fossil fuel subsidies refer to those subsidies which encourage increased uptake of
environmentally-damaging fossil fuels or which facilitate environmentally-damaging practices. Firstly,
general indirectly damaging fossil fuel supports come primarily in the form of revenue which is foregone
as a result of the excise rates on certain fuels being lower than a certain benchmark rate (in this case, that of
unleaded petrol). The fuels modelled in this paper to which the excise rate applies are auto diesel, marked
diesel, fuel oil, and kerosene. Moreover, there are sectoral fuel subsidies for the air transportation and
land transportation (hauliers).11 The amount of calculated indirect subsidies totals over C1.73 billion.12
3 Related Literature
Steps to remove fossil fuel subsidies at a global scale are generally few and far between, with varying
degrees of efforts from relevant states. IEA and OECD (2018) analyses the current state of play regard-
ing G20 member states’ efforts to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, as had been committed in
2009. They estimate a decrease of around 18% in subsidies from 2015 to 2016 but recognise around 40
10 Some subsidy schemes with a negligible budgetary cost are excluded from our analysis, including a programme for promoting
hydrocarbon exploration (PIP, 2018) and the PSO Air Services Scheme to subsidise two internal flight routes (Lee, 2016). In
2014, the total cost of these allocated subsidies was less then C10 million.
11 The Diesel Rebate Scheme, which is a support mechanism in which the Revenue Commissioners will repay some of the
mineral oil tax which a qualifying road transport operator pays, subject to the diesel being purchased by one’s business in the
state and being used in qualifying motor vehicles for business purposes (Revenue, 2019).
12 Some schemes, including: Vehicle Registration Tax (VRT) relief for leased cars; general VRT exemptions; and a Disabled
Drivers and Disabled Passengers Scheme, related to VRT exemptions for specially-adapted vehicles, are also excluded. These
amounted to around C52 million in 2014.
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economies as being subsidisers of fossil fuels. The report suggests that support in OECD countries has
“flattened” since 2014. Individual OECD member states have made some efforts to reduce fossil fuel sub-
sidies, though larger support mechanisms still remain. Belgium and France, for example, started plans to
erase the tax differentiation between gasoline and diesel. A similar policy option is also considered in the
recent climate action plan (Government of Ireland, 2019). Finland has increased some energy and CO2
taxes, whilst removing the tax exemption on LPG. The case is similar in Sweden, where most energy and
CO2 tax exemptions have been eradicated, alongside the uprating of energy taxes on diesel and gasoline.
Small measures taken in France include the increase of diesel taxation to align it with petrol taxation.
For the UK, steps have been taken to rebalance the levy rates between energies, aiming to reach equality
between gas and electricity by 2025.
Although there are a large number of countries having similar fossil fuel subsidy schemes, the liter-
ature on the removal of these subsidies is quite poor. In this regard, this report not only contributes to
our understanding of subsidy removal for the case of Ireland but also fills a gap in the general literature.
Steenblik & Coroyannakis (1995) finds that removing producer and consumer subsidies in Western Eu-
rope would lead to environmental improvements, as well as improving competition in national electric
power industries. Burniaux & Chateau (2014) refers to competition effects of subsidy removal: the re-
moval of subsidies in non-OECD countries would lead to a carbon leakage in OECD countries, and thus,
an increase in emissions towards 2050. Jewell et al. (2018) also supports this competition perspective,
contending that the removal of global fossil fuel subsidies would have a surprisingly small impact on
energy demand and emissions since consumers would switch from subsidised oil to coal, while countries
that do not remove subsidies would increase natural gas and oil consumption. Outside of Europe, both
Lin & Li (2012) and Ouyang & Lin (2014) analyse the impacts of removing subsidies for China, using
general equilibrium modelling. The former finds that subsidy removals would impact welfare, emissions,
and competitiveness disproportionately: those countries without subsidy removals would benefit in com-
petitiveness, compared to those countries that implement the phasing out. The results of the latter study
reveal that negative macroeconomic impacts of subsidies removal can be largely mitigated if only 10%
of subsidies are removed while increasing subsidies for renewable energies has positive macroeconomic
impacts. Finally, Beaton & Lonton (2010) evaluates the effectiveness of two strategies (an unconditional
cash transfer to households and the roll-out of a programme designed to incentivise household switching
from kerosene to LPG usage) used in Indonesia to reduce the impacts of fossil fuel subsidy reform. The
paper contends that both programmes were adequately implemented and successful in overturning oppo-
sition to a fuel subsidy reform and in counteracting adverse economic effects of the reforms, achieved in
a wider context of educating the general population on the benefits of such reforms.
4 The I3E Model
The I3E model is the first fully dynamic, i.e. intertemporal, Computable Generable Equilibrium (CGE)
model for the Irish economy. In the following subsections, the economic agents defined in the model and
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the interactions across these agents are discussed in a non-technical manner. The technical details of the
model economy are provided in de Bruin & Yakut (2019b). The model parameters are calibrated by using
an energy social accounting matrix (ESAM). The data sources and the details of the construction process
of the ESAM are available in de Bruin & Yakut (2019a).
1. Households: The household sector of the I3E model consists of ten representative household
groups (RHGs). The RHGs with the abbreviation of u1 to u5 are the urban resident households,
and u1 (u5) represents the poorest (richest) RHG. Similarly, the RHGs with the abbreviation of r1
to r5 are the rural resident households, and r1 (r5) represents the poorest (richest) RHG.
• Households choose the optimal level of composite consumption by maximising their utilities
subject to their budget constraint. The budget constraints of RHGs equate the disposable
income – the sum of wage income, dividend income, welfare transfers and pension income
from the government, and net factor income from abroad – to the sum of total consumption
expenditures and savings. Private savings are determined as a residual, i.e. what households
do not spend is saved.
• Data Source: The RHGs are constructed by using the HBS of 2015-2016. Each household
in the survey is uniquely assigned to a RHG, and then the household-level values of income
items and consumption expenditures by commodities are aggregated to generate the RHG-
level figures. The model is able to display heterogeneous policy impacts across household
types as the RHGs have distinct compositions of disposable income and consumption. The
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) is used to obtain the composition of house-
hold wage income by the types of labour (i.e. low-, medium-, and high-skilled), as the HBS
does not provide individual-level data.
2. Firms and Production: The production sector comprises 32 representative activities/firms which
represent the main producers in the Irish economy regarding total value-added, labour demand,
sectoral emissions. Firms are allowed to produce multiple products, i.e. a firm can produce two
or more products which are either secondary outputs of the primary production process or entirely
different products. Some of the firms produce only one commodity, e.g. public administration, or
the shares of secondary products are quite negligible in total production.
• Twenty-seven out of 32 activities determine the level of physical investment by maximising
the value of the firm in an intertemporal manner.13 A share of combustion-related emissions
of the manufacturing sectors and the emissions of energy production sectors are subject to the
EU-ETS legislation. The I3E model has an explicit representation of the ETS: each activity
takes into account its composition of energy demand, the activity emissions subject to the
13 Having an intertemporal investment decision of firms allows the I3E model to explore economic dynamics in a more real-
istic framework. In the absence of such a feature, the model dynamics would only rely on the consumption smoothing of
households, as households seek to achieve a stable level of utility over time.
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ETS, and free allowances to reduce its ETS emissions and thus the cost of the ETS. In this
respect, each activity pays the same purchaser, i.e. retail, price to buy an energy commod-
ity but the perceived cost of unit demand is a function of the activity’s ETS coverage, free
allowances, and the EU-ETS price which is an exogenous variable.
• Data Source: The main data source for inter-sectoral linkages is the Supply and Use Tables
(SUTs) provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The original SUTs provide informa-
tion on which industry produces which products, the monetary value of production of each
product, the cost of intermediate inputs, the value of gross value-added (payments to the fac-
tors of production), production taxes paid to the government, etc. The Labour Force Survey
(LFS) is used to disaggregate the sectoral labour demand into types of labour.
3. Commodities: There are 39 commodities in the I3E model: two of them are entirely imported
(crude oil and coal), 33 are both domestically produced and imported, and the supply of four com-
modities is entirely provided by domestic producers. The energy/carbon commodities included in
I3E are peat, coal, natural gas, diesel, gasoline, kerosene, LPG, crude oil, fuel oil, other petroleum
products, and electricity. The total domestic demand for a commodity is equal to the sum of six
items: intermediate input demand, household demand, government demand, investment demand,
trade and transportation margin demand, and finally export demand.
• In the supply side, domestic production and import are assumed to be an imperfect substitute
of each other, i.e. a final consumer cannot substitute its domestic demand for import in a
one-to-one manner. Each component on the demand side comes from the optimal demand
by a user: intermediate input demand–cost minimisation problem; household demand–utility
maximisation problem, government demand–fixed share of the total government demand, in-
vestment demand–fixed fraction of the total investment expenditures, trade and transportation
margin demand–fixed fraction of output, and export demand–revenue maximisation problem.
For each commodity, an equilibrium condition is defined and associated with the price of the
commodity, i.e. the commodity prices are endogenously solved in the model.
• Data Source: The SUTs also provide data on the sources of supply (domestic production and
import) and the sources of demand.
4. Labour Types: There are low-, medium-, and high-skilled labour in the I3E model.
• For the fixed supply of each type of labour, the labour market equilibrium conditions solve
for the optimal wage rate.
• Data Source: The SILC and LFS are utilised to get the compositions of wage income of
households and labour demand of sectors, respectively. In the SILC, individuals with no
formal/primary and lower secondary education are low-skilled, individuals with upper sec-
ondary, post leaving cert, and third level (non degree) education are medium-skilled, and
finally individuals with third level (with a degree or above) education are high-skilled labour.
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5. Enterprises: The model includes an “enterprises” account, where a representative enterprise is
assumed to be the owner of all firms. The account collects all gross sectoral profits and receives
transfers from the government, which are fixed in nominal terms, and pays corporate tax to the
government. The remaining amount is either saved by the enterprise account (fixed fraction of
net-of-tax profit receipts) or paid to households as dividend payments.
6. Government: The I3E model has an explicit representation of the government sector. The govern-
ment collects direct taxes on labour incomes and sectoral profits (corporate tax), indirect taxes on
sales of commodities, the carbon tax on energy commodities, the export tax on exported electricity,
production tax on production activities, and half of the cost of ETS due to the EU legislation. The
carbon tax, which is exogenously determined by the government, is implemented as a fixed price of
per-tonne equivalent of carbon and collected on the domestic consumption of energy-commodities.
The government allocates its total revenues to the consumption of commodities, welfare transfers
and pension payments to households (fixed in real terms - indexed to the average wage), transfers to
enterprises (fixed in nominal terms), and interest payments over the outstanding foreign debt stock.
The difference between total revenues and expenditures of the government is public saving which
drives changes in the foreign debt stock, i.e. as public saving increases (decreases), the government
debt stock becomes lower (higher).
7. Rest of the world: All monetary flows between the rest of the world and Ireland are traced within
the RoW account. The sources of the foreign exchange supply are exports of commodities and
the net factor income of households. The sources of foreign exchange demand are imports of
commodities, the interest payments of the government over the outstanding foreign debt stock, and
half of the cost of ETS due to the EU legislation. The difference between the totals of foreign
exchange supply and demand is covered by foreign savings, i.e. the current account balance. The
foreign market closure rule implies that for the given level of foreign savings, the equilibrium in
the rest of the world account is ensured by the exchange rate adjustment.
5 Experiments
Along the baseline (business-as-usual, BaU hereafter) scenario of I3E, the realised changes in interna-
tional prices have been introduced and no further impositions have been put on international energy prices
beyond 2019. In other words, all international energy prices are kept constant at their 2018 levels until
the end of the model horizon. In addition, declining EU-ETS allowance figures in the third (2013–2020)
and fourth phases (2021–2030) of the EU-ETS and the positive trend in the EU-ETS price have also been
introduced along the path of BaU and all other scenarios. Except for these economic developments, all
policy variables are assumed to be fixed at their 2014 levels. For instance, the level of carbon tax per tonne
equivalent of CO2 is kept constant at C20 along the path of BaU . Besides the BaU , eleven experiments
are designed to understand the implications of the removal of fossil fuel subsidies on the Irish economy,
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as summarised in Table 1. In all these experiments, all other policy variables are assumed be constant at
their calibrated vales for the year 2014.
Table 1: Linking Fossil Fuel Subsidies to the I3E Model
Scenario Removed Subsidy Recipient in
I3E
Total Subsidy,
Cm in 2014
I3E Policy
Variable
Change, %
BaU Business-as-usual – no
change in policy
PT PEA Electricity Generation
from Peat
PEA 119 Production
tax rate
2,245.28
PT ELC Security of Electricity
Supply
ELC 104.7 Production
tax rate
50.53
PT ATS Excise Exemption on
Aviation Fuel
ATS 425.9 Production
tax rate
212.07
PT LTS Diesel Rebate Scheme LTS 21.2 Production
tax rate
56.17
ST DIE1 Excise Exemption on
Auto Diesel
DIE 309.4 Sales tax rate 25.40
ST DIE2 Excise Exemption on
Marked & Auto Diesel
DIE 793.6 Sales tax rate 65.18
ST FUO Excise Exemption on
Fuel oil
FUO 30.9 Sales tax rate 3,096.19
ST KRS Excise Exemption on
Kerosene
KRS 460.1 Sales tax rate 38.70*
EA HH Energy Allowance HH 402.2 Transfers &
share par.
-1.87
ALL All of the above
ALL–HH All of the above except
EA HH
Note: The lists of activities and commodities are available in Appendix A. The production tax rates are
activity-specific, whereas the sales tax rates are commodity-specific in the I3E model. The last column
shows the percentage change in the respective tax rate due to the removal of the subsidy.
∗: The value of sales tax rate. Since there was no sales tax on the commodity of kerosene in 2014, the
percentage change in the sales tax rate after the removal of the subsidy is undefined.
In the experiments of PT x, the recipient is a production activity, and the removal of the subsidy affects
the production tax rate of the activity. The production tax is paid by the activity to the government over the
monetary value of total production. In the experiment of PT PEA, for instance, the peat sector receives
the subsidy to produce electricity from peat. In the SUTs for Ireland, the net tax (tax minus subsidy) paid
to the government by the peat sector was C5.3 million.14 Removing of the entire subsidy (C119 million)
paid to the sector increases the production tax rate of the sector by 2,245.3%: the production tax rate will
be 23 times higher than its calibrated value for the year of 2014.15
14 As the peat sector is not provided in the original SUTs, the mining sector (NACE 5–9) is disaggregated into peat and other
mining sectors. See de Bruin & Yakut (2019a) for details.
15 In all experiments but PT PEA, the corresponding I3E policy variable is assumed to change in 2020 and stays at its new level
until the end of the model horizon. In the PT PEA scenario, however, the production tax rate of the peat activity gradually
increases and reaches its new level in 2026.
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In the experiments of ST y, the recipient is a commodity, and the removal of the subsidy affects the
sales tax rate of the commodity. The sales tax is paid by the commodity to the government over the value
of total domestic sales. In the experiment of ST FUO, for instance, the fuel oil commodity receives the
subsidy to lower the domestic price of fuel oil. In the SUTs for Ireland, the net tax (tax minus subsidy)
paid to the government by the commodity of fuel oil was C0.99 million.16 Since the commodity of fuel
oil is subsidised hugely, the removal of the subsidy makes the sales tax rate on the commodity 31 times
higher than its calibrated value for the year of 2014. In 2014, the Irish government was collecting a carbon
tax, but there was no additional sales tax from the consumption of kerosene. Therefore, in the ST KRS
scenario, the removal of the subsidy corresponds to a 31% sales tax rate on kerosene.
In the experiment EA HH, households receive means-tested energy allowances from the government.
The subsidy figure in Table 1 is the sum of electricity allowance, gas allowance, fuel allowance, and other
supplements (heating allowance). As the eligibility rule to be a recipient of those energy allowances is
dependent on welfare transfers of the government, it is assumed that the removal of the household subsi-
dies affects the poorest two quintiles in both areas of residences. Therefore, it is assumed that the value of
welfare transfer receipt of each of these four RHGs is reduced by C100m, and their shares parameters are
recalibrated; i.e. the shares of these four RHGs in the total government transfers declined, whereas the
shares of the remaining RHGs increased. The total value of government transfers to households decreases
by 1.87% for the year of 2014.
In the ALL scenario, the combined impacts of the removal of all subsidies are evaluated. In this
scenario, the subsidies on both marked and auto diesel are assumed to be removed simultaneously, and
the sales tax rate of diesel is assumed to increase by 65.2%. The scenario, namely ALL–HH, includes the
removal of all subsidies but the energy allowances of households which has the highest adverse effects
on household welfare as these allowances are received by the welfare-dependent households.
In addition, a set of scenarios in which each policy option is associated with a gradually increasing
carbon tax towards 2030 is run. It is assumed that the level of the carbon tax is increasing by C6 every
year starting from 2020. In 2029, the level of tax reaches C80 and it stays constant at this level until the
end of the model horizon, i.e. 2050. For instance, in the experiment of PT ELC tax, the production tax
rate of the electricity production sector increases by 50.5% in 2020 and stays at its new level until the end
of the model horizon and the level of carbon tax increases by C6 in every year between 2020 and 2029.
6 Results
Along the path of BaU , the domestic purchaser prices of LPG, fuel oil, diesel, and kerosene decline in
2030, whereas the prices of coal, natural gas, and gasoline increase in 2030, relative to their levels in
2014. As peat and coal are a close substitute of each other, increasing coal price pushes the price of
peat up as well. The price patterns of the primary energy commodities, alterations in the composition
16 All energy commodities are disaggregated from broader energy commodities provided in the SUTs. de Bruin & Yakut
(2019a) provides details.
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of input demand of the electricity production, and the peat activity’s increasing electricity supply lower
the domestic price of electricity in 2030, relative to 2014. Lower energy prices decrease the cost of
production and drag down the domestic prices of all non-energy commodities, although the impacts are
at negligible levels.
The combined effects of the realisations on the overall macroeconomic aggregates such as real gross
domestic product, government indebtedness, trade balance, etc. are minimal. On the other hand, lower
energy prices invoke the domestic demand for the energy commodities and thus result in a 7.6% increase
in the economy-wide CO2 emissions in 2018, relative to 2014. Moreover, the emissions grow at rates
of 3.7% and 3.9% per annum on average along the path of BaU until 2030 and 2040, respectively, if
the energy prices are kept constant at their 2018 levels, as assumed in the model, and there is no change
in environmental policies. In other words, the growth rate of emissions exceeds the economic growth
rate and increases emissions-to-output ratio, i.e. the Irish economy becomes more carbon-intensive.
Although its magnitude is negligible, increasing economic activity makes households better off regarding
real disposable income. Higher disposable income and lower commodity prices lead to an increase in
private consumption demand of households.
In each policy experiment considered in this study, the main impact comes from direct and indirect
changes in the purchaser prices of energy and non-energy commodities, respectively. However, the source
of price impact differs across experiments regarding the I3E policy variable affected bt the policy change.
For instance, in the experiments of ST y, commodity prices increase due to the removal of subsidies,
whereas in the experiments of PT x, the cost of production increases as the rate of production tax in-
creases. In the latter group of experiments, the price impact is indirect as the higher cost of production
hinders the supply, which, in turn, leads to higher commodity prices. In the former set, however, the price
impacts are direct as purchaser price of a commodity is a function of the sales tax rate. In the experiment
of EA HH, on the other hand, the main impact comes from changes in household disposable income due
to the removal of the energy subsidies. In all experiments, higher prices lower demand on commodities,
which hinders the increase in prices as the general equilibrium impacts are fully taken into account. In
the following subsections, experiments are explained in a comparative manner.
6.1 Emissions
Removing the fossil fuel subsidies is one of the options of the Irish government in reaching its legally
binding non-ETS emissions targets for 2030. The targets were set to 33 million tonnes of non-ETS
emissions, which corresponds to a 30% reduction compared to its 2005 level. The results of the I3E
model show that removing only one of the considered fossil fuel subsidies and keeping the carbon tax at
its current level (C20 per tonne of CO2) generates a 2.9%, on average, reduction in the economy-wide
CO2 emissions in 2030, relative to BaU , Table 2. The largest emissions reduction is obtained in the
scenario of SaleTax DIE2 (8.4%), which is followed by ST KRS (6.1%), ST DIE1 (3.7%) and PT PEA
(3.3%) in 2030.
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Table 2: The Level of Economy-wide CO2 Emissions by Scenario, million tonne
Scenario 2025 2030 2040 Scenario 2025 2030 2040
BaU 49.9 58.7 81.4
PT ATS 48.6 57.1 78.9 PT ATS tax 44.1 48.9 67.2
PT ELC 49.4 58.2 80.6 PT ELC tax 44.8 49.6 68.4
PT LTS 49.9 58.7 81.3 PT LTS tax 45.2 50.1 69.0
PT PEA 49.0 56.8 78.4 PT PEA tax 44.5 48.5 66.5
ST DIE1 48.1 56.5 78.3 ST DIE1 tax 43.7 48.4 66.6
ST DIE2 45.8 53.8 74.4 ST DIE2 tax 41.6 46.1 63.4
ST FUO 49.7 58.5 81.0 ST FUO tax 45.0 49.9 68.7
ST KRS 46.9 55.2 76.4 ST KRS tax 42.6 47.2 64.9
EA HH 49.8 58.6 81.2 EA HH tax 45.1 50.0 68.9
ALL 40.7 46.9 64.3 ALL tax 37.1 40.3 55.0
ALL-HH 40.8 47.0 64.4 ALL-HH tax 37.2 40.5 55.2
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1.
On the other hand, PT LT S and EA HH have the lowest impacts (0.1% and 0.2%, respectively.) If
the government removes all fossil fuel subsidies simultaneously by 2020 without increasing the carbon
tax, the decline in the economy-wide CO2 emissions reaches 20.2% in 2030, compared to BaU . If the
removal of a fossil fuel subsidy is accompanied by a gradual increase in the carbon tax, the average
decline in the total emissions increases to 17%. In other words, the positive trend of the carbon tax leads
to 14.1 percentage points contribution to the decline in the level of emissions. The removal of all subsidies
with the increasing pattern of the carbon tax leads to 31.3% decline in the total emissions. Excluding the
household allowances from the removal of all subsidies regardless of the level of the carbon tax has
negative but negligible impacts on the emissions reduction process along the path of ALL–HH. Figure 2
shows the level of cumulative emissions in the period of 2014-2040 for three scenarios.
Figure 2: Cumulative Economy-wide CO2 Emissions by Scenario, million tonne
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The level of economy-wide emissions is the sum of the ETS and non-ETS emissions. The former
covers the sectoral emissions including combustion-related and process emissions, while the non-ETS
emissions, depicted in Figure 3, is the sum of sectoral non-ETS emissions, household emissions, govern-
ment emissions, and investment-demand related emissions. Figure 3 depicts the path of the total non-ETS
emissions, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s projections on the agricultural non-
energy emissions. Removing all fossil fuel subsidies would reduce the total non-ETS emissions by 11.7%
in 2030, relative to BaU . However, the level of non-ETS emissions will be 49.2 million in 2030 along the
path of ALL, and it is 49.5% higher than the Irish emissions target for 2030.
Figure 3: Total Non-ETS CO2 Emissions by Scenario, million tonne
If the removal of the subsidies is complemented by the increasing carbon tax, the reduction reaches
18.4%, compared to BaU , but the level of emissions will still be 38.1% higher than the target for 2030.
In other words, the implementation of other existing measures concerning ceasing of coal and peat from
electricity production, increasing the share of renewable in electricity production, electrification of trans-
portation, retrofitting, etc. is also important in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
The removal of diesel subsidies has the highest impacts on the sectoral non-ETS emissions, Table 3,
and the transportation, agriculture, construction, and trade sectors are hit the hardest. These results are
based on the activities’ energy demand compositions in which the share of diesel in the transportation
and agriculture sectors’ total energy demand is the highest among all energy commodities.17
The removal of the fossil fuel subsidies received by the peat activity decreases the sector’s total non-
ETS emissions to one-third of its level along the path of BaU . All other scenarios have negligible impacts
on the sectoral non-ETS emissions. If the government removes all fossil fuel subsidies at once in 2020, the
mining sector’s non-ETS emissions decline by more than 70%, and it is followed by the transportation,
agriculture, and construction sectors. On the other hand, the gradually increased carbon tax strongly
17 The I3E model, as explained in Section 4, takes into account heterogeneities across the production activities regarding the
composition of their energy demand.
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Table 3: Sectoral Non-ETS Emissions in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
AGR MIN MAN CON TRP ACC FSR TRD PUB SER
PT ATS 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1
PT ELC -0.5 -1.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5
PT LTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PT PEA -0.2 -68.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3
ST DIE1 -12.8 -3.1 -3.3 -9.6 -14.1 -5.1 -3.9 -9.2 -7.9 -5.9
ST DIE2 -28.1 -7.0 -7.4 -21.2 -30.6 -11.5 -8.7 -20.5 -17.6 -13.1
ST FUO -0.3 -0.3 -1.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
ST KRS 0.0 -1.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -1.3 -1.0 -1.1 -2.9 -3.0
EA HH -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.1
ALL -28.7 -71.8 -10.6 -22.9 -32.6 -13.6 -10.7 -22.8 -21.2 -17.1
ALL-HH -28.6 -71.7 -10.5 -22.7 -32.6 -13.6 -10.6 -22.7 -21.4 -17.0
PT ATS tax -22.5 -23.3 -17.0 -20.3 -27.7 -18.4 -13.7 -20.0 -18.6 -16.3
PT ELC tax -23.1 -24.2 -17.5 -20.3 -27.2 -18.6 -14.3 -20.2 -18.7 -16.7
PT LTS tax -22.7 -23.1 -17.0 -19.9 -27.5 -18.2 -13.8 -19.8 -18.4 -16.3
PT PEA tax -22.9 -74.0 -17.3 -20.3 -27.1 -18.4 -14.1 -20.0 -18.6 -16.5
ST DIE1 tax -32.7 -25.3 -19.6 -27.4 -37.3 -22.3 -16.9 -27.1 -24.7 -20.9
ST DIE2 tax -44.5 -28.1 -22.7 -36.4 -49.4 -27.3 -20.8 -35.9 -32.5 -26.6
ST FUO tax -22.9 -23.3 -18.4 -20.0 -27.1 -18.3 -14.0 -20.1 -18.7 -16.5
ST KRS tax -22.7 -24.5 -17.6 -20.3 -27.4 -19.4 -14.7 -20.7 -20.9 -18.9
EA HH tax -23.0 -23.5 -17.2 -20.2 -27.2 -18.3 -14.1 -20.0 -18.3 -16.4
ALL tax -45.0 -76.8 -25.5 -37.8 -50.8 -29.2 -22.6 -37.8 -35.6 -30.1
ALL-HH tax -44.8 -76.7 -25.3 -37.6 -50.7 -29.1 -22.4 -37.6 -35.7 -30.0
Note: The acrimonies for sectors are as follows: AGR Agriculture, MIN Mining, MAN Manufacturing,
CON Construction, T RP Transportation, ACC Accommodation and Hotels, FSR Financial Services, T RD
Trade Activities, PUB Public Administration, and SER Services. The list of aggregated sectors and cor-
responding sub-sectors is available in Appendix A. Since the entire emissions of the electricity production
sector are covered by the ETS, the sector does not have any non-ETS emissions. The transportation (TRP)
sector covers the land, air, and water transportation sectors, but its non-ETS emissions exclude the air
transportation sector as it does not have any non-ETS emissions.
amplifies the emission reduction in all scenarios by 76%, on average, in the ALL tax scenario, relative to
ALL. The higher level of the carbon tax more than doubles impacts on the sectoral non-ETS emissions of
the manufacturing, accommodation and hotels, and financial services sectors.
The reduction in the sectoral ETS emissions depends on the ETS emissions-to-total-emissions ratio
(a fixed parameter), the free allowance-to-ETS-emissions ratio (endogenous variable) of an activity, and
the composition of sectoral energy demand (if an activity uses commodities with higher carbon content
more, the activity needs an adjustment process to have a reduction in the ETS emissions due to changes
in the prices of these commodities). Notice that along the path of each experiment, the decreasing free
allowances (until 2030) and the positive trend in the ETS price (until 2018) are taken into account.
As Table 4 indicates, the removal of the diesel-related subsidies generates the strongest impacts,
but other activity- or commodity-related subsidies also play important roles in the emissions reduction
process. For instance, the removal of the subsidies on aviation fuel (PT AT S) and kerosene (ST KRS) hit
the air transportation sector hardest as the sector’s emissions are entirely covered by the ETS. The removal
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Table 4: Sectoral ETS Emissions, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Emissions Cost of ETS Total Cost
of ETSMAN ELC TRP SER MAN ELC TRP SER
PT ATS -0.7 -0.6 -25.0 -0.1 -1.0 -0.6 -38.4 -0.1 -11.7
PT ELC -0.4 -3.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -3.2 -0.2 -0.5 -1.5
PT LTS -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
PT PEA -0.3 -6.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -6.8 -0.1 -0.4 -2.8
ST DIE1 -2.0 -1.2 -3.8 -7.1 -2.8 -1.2 -5.9 -7.2 -3.1
ST DIE2 -4.4 -2.9 -8.7 -15.8 -6.3 -2.9 -13.4 -16.1 -7.0
ST FUO -0.8 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7
ST KRS -1.2 -3.2 -21.3 -1.7 -1.7 -3.2 -32.7 -1.7 -11.3
EA HH -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
ALL -7.6 -16.3 -44.6 -18.5 -10.8 -16.3 -68.4 -18.8 -29.6
ALL-HH -7.4 -16.1 -44.5 -18.4 -10.5 -16.1 -68.3 -18.7 -29.5
PT ATS tax -10.7 -14.9 -35.5 -17.5 -15.2 -14.9 -54.5 -17.9 -26.4
PT ELC tax -10.5 -17.2 -15.1 -17.9 -14.9 -17.2 -23.2 -18.2 -18.2
PT LTS tax -10.2 -14.5 -15.0 -17.5 -14.5 -14.5 -23.1 -17.8 -17.0
PT PEA tax -10.3 -20.1 -15.0 -17.7 -14.7 -20.1 -23.1 -18.1 -19.3
ST DIE1 tax -11.7 -15.5 -18.0 -23.1 -16.7 -15.5 -27.5 -23.5 -19.4
ST DIE2 tax -13.8 -16.8 -21.7 -29.9 -19.6 -16.8 -33.3 -30.5 -22.5
ST FUO tax -10.8 -15.2 -15.0 -17.7 -15.4 -15.2 -23.1 -18.1 -17.6
ST KRS tax -11.1 -17.1 -32.0 -18.9 -15.8 -17.1 -49.2 -19.2 -26.0
EA HH tax -10.4 -14.8 -15.2 -17.6 -14.7 -14.8 -23.3 -18.0 -17.2
ALL tax -16.4 -28.1 -51.3 -32.3 -23.4 -28.1 -78.6 -32.9 -41.2
ALL-HH tax -16.2 -27.9 -51.2 -32.2 -23.1 -27.9 -78.5 -32.7 -41.0
Note: The acrimonies for sectors are as follows: MAN Manufacturing, ELC Electricity Production, T RP Trans-
portation, and SER Services. The list of aggregated sectors and corresponding sub-sectors is available in Appendix
A, and the list of scenarios is available in Table 1. The ETS emissions of the manufacturing (MAN) sector include
the process emissions of the other non-metallic minerals sector. The transportation (TRP) sector’s emissions include
process emissions resulting from its fuel purchases outside of Ireland. See de Bruin & Yakut (2019a, 26) and de
Bruin & Yakut (2019b, 18) for details.
of all subsidies leads to 45% reduction in aviation emissions. If the government increases the level of
carbon tax towards 2030, the ETS emissions of the TRP sector reduce to half, whereas the magnitudes
of the decline in the ETS emissions of the ELC and SER sectors are around 30%. The removal of all
subsidies except the household allowances dampens the reductions in sectoral emissions, but the impacts
are at negligible levels.
6.2 Sectoral Impacts
The removal of a fossil fuel subsidy that is directly related to a sector adversely affects the sector’s cost of
production via the higher level of production tax and thus leads to a reduction in the sectoral real value-
added, Table 5. In the experiments of PT x, the impacts on the volumes of real value-added of the other
sectors that are not directly affected by the removal of subsidy are negligible. Some sectors experience an
increase in their real value-added as the production of some sectors shrinks, their labour demand declines
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and employees shift from these sectors to other sectors and lower the cost of production.18
Table 5: Sectoral Real Value-added in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenario AGR MIN MAN ELC CON TRP ACC FSR TRD PUB SER
PT ATS 0.21 0.06 0.25 -0.26 -0.22 -9.84 0.02 0.17 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10
PT ELC -0.04 -0.33 -0.05 -2.05 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.03
PT LTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.29 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
PT PEA -0.01 -9.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.20 0.04 0.15 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.17
ST DIE1 -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 -0.66 -0.16 -1.17 0.27 -0.05 -0.12 0.15 -0.14
ST DIE2 -0.43 -0.25 -0.33 -1.56 -0.36 -2.82 0.64 -0.10 -0.28 0.29 -0.32
ST FUO -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00
ST KRS 0.08 -0.35 -0.02 -2.28 -0.17 -3.30 0.19 -0.01 -0.21 0.22 -0.04
EA HH -0.16 -0.21 -0.16 -0.14 -0.20 -0.02 0.06 -0.15 -0.12 0.33 -0.02
ALL -0.43 -9.74 -0.42 -6.10 -1.16 -14.31 1.16 -0.15 -0.76 0.82 -0.67
ALL-HH -0.28 -9.57 -0.26 -5.98 -0.96 -14.26 1.10 -0.01 -0.65 0.49 -0.65
PT ATS tax -0.11 -1.97 -0.31 -2.48 -0.61 -13.18 0.84 0.07 -0.45 0.46 -0.30
PT ELC tax -0.33 -2.32 -0.58 -4.28 -0.47 -4.19 0.88 -0.10 -0.35 0.66 -0.24
PT LTS tax -0.29 -2.03 -0.54 -2.28 -0.40 -4.44 0.85 -0.09 -0.33 0.60 -0.20
PT PEA tax -0.30 -10.00 -0.57 -2.41 -0.59 -4.16 0.96 -0.13 -0.37 0.55 -0.36
ST DIE1 tax -0.45 -2.11 -0.66 -2.89 -0.54 -5.19 1.08 -0.12 -0.43 0.66 -0.33
ST DIE2 tax -0.65 -2.22 -0.80 -3.73 -0.72 -6.74 1.43 -0.16 -0.55 0.74 -0.51
ST FUO tax -0.33 -2.06 -0.58 -2.28 -0.41 -4.20 0.85 -0.08 -0.34 0.60 -0.20
ST KRS tax -0.21 -2.34 -0.54 -4.41 -0.55 -7.03 1.00 -0.09 -0.50 0.73 -0.24
EA HH tax -0.45 -2.23 -0.69 -2.42 -0.61 -4.27 0.89 -0.24 -0.44 0.91 -0.22
ALL tax -0.66 -10.67 -0.88 -8.08 -1.47 -17.22 1.93 -0.21 -0.99 1.19 -0.84
ALL-HH tax -0.51 -10.50 -0.73 -7.94 -1.27 -17.20 1.87 -0.06 -0.87 0.86 -0.82
Note: The acrimonies for sectors are as follows: AGR Agriculture, MIN Mining, MAN Manufacturing, ELC Electricity
Production, CON Construction, T RP Transportation, ACC Accommodation and Hotels, FSR Financial Services, T RD
Trade Activities, PUB Public Administration, and SER Services. The list of aggregated sectors and corresponding
sub-sectors is available in Appendix A, and the list of scenarios is available in Table 1.
In the experiment of PT AT S, the aggregate transportation sector’s real value-added shrinks by almost
10% as the production tax rate of the aviation sector is tripled, relative to BaU , and its value-added
constitutes more than half of the aggregate value-added of the transportation sector. On the other hand,
the removal of the subsidies on the land transportation sector has negligible impacts on the aggregate
value-added of the transportation sector along the path of PT LT S. As the production tax rate of the
peat sector dramatically increases between 2020 and 2026, the sectoral real value-added decreases by 9%
along the path of PT PEA in 2030, compared to BaU .
In the cases of removing the fossil fuel subsidies on commodities, the impacts are the largest for the
transportation and electricity production sectors, especially when the subsidies on diesel and kerosene
are removed. The removal of households’ energy allowances has quite negligible impacts on sectoral
value-added. If all fossil fuel subsidies are removed, the transportation, mining and electricity production
sectors are hit the hardest. These impacts are mainly driven by the removal of the sector related subsidies,
and the higher level of sales tax rates on the diesel and kerosene commodities are also effective.
18 It should be noted that since the current version has no involuntary unemployment, the model works under the assumption of
full employment: if a sector’s labour demand declines, its former employees must be employed by some other sectors.
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The sectoral impacts become larger in absolute terms when the subsidy removal process is accompa-
nied by an increase in the level of the carbon tax. For instance, the transportation sector’s real value-added
decreases by almost three percentage points more in the experiment of ALL tax compared to the ALL sce-
nario. The differences for the electricity production and mining sectors are two and one percentage points,
respectively, between these two experiment paths.
If the energy allowances of households are excluded from the removal of all fossil fuel subsidies,
the adverse impacts on sectoral real value-added will be lower by seven percentage points, on average,
along the paths of ALL–HH and ALL–HH tax relative to ALL and ALL tax scenarios, respectively. The
differences across scenarios are higher than ten percentage points for the sectors of agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, electricity production, construction, and financial services.
In all experiments, with or without an increase in the level of the carbon tax, real value-added of the
accommodation & hotels (ACC) and public administration (PUB) sectors are affected positively. The
reason for the former sector is that the commodity produced by the sector has the highest share in the
composition of private consumption expenditures across service-related sectors. For the latter sector,
on the other hand, the primary final consumer of the commodities produced by the PUB sector is the
government: 40% of the total supply of commodity PUB is demanded by the Irish government.19
6.3 Macroeconomic Impacts
The macroeconomic impacts of the removal of fossil fuel subsidies in 2030 are summarised for selected
indicators in Table 6. Removing only one subsidy at the current level of the carbon tax leads to a reduction
in the overall economic activity at most by 0.5% in 2030 along the path of ST DIE2 relative to BaU , and
the annual average growth rate will drop from 3.3% to 3.292%.20 The experiment is followed by PT AT S
with a 0.34% reduction in the real GDP and by ST DIE1 and ST KRS with a decline by 0.22%. In line
with the overall economic activity, the level of real investment expenditure will be lower than its BaU
level. The impact is higher than 1% in absolute terms only along the path of ST DIE2, whereas the
average impact across the experiments without an increase in the carbon tax is 0.4%.
In all experiments, the level of nominal GDP decreases since the quantity impact suppresses the price
impact. The net exports, i.e. trade balance, slightly (0.09% on average in 2030, compared to BaU)
deteriorate as the higher domestic prices hinder the export demand, i.e. the demand for Irish commodities
in international markets. However, as the growth rate of nominal GDP ratio is higher than that of the net
exports, in absolute terms, net exports-to-GDP-ratio improves in all scenarios except PT AT S, although
the impacts are negligible in general. The government foreign debt stock to (nominal) GDP ratio declines
in several scenarios. The government consumption demand for commodities is a positive function of the
level of nominal GDP: the lower economic activity lowers the expenditures of the government.
19 The public commodities are produced by the sector PUB, which covers public administration and defence and compulsory
social security (NACE code 84), whereas the public policy regarding revenue collection and expenditure execution is carried
by the government.
20 The annual average growth rate is calculated for the period of 2014-2054.
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Table 6: Macroeconomic Impacts in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenario Real GDP Real Investment Net Export-to-GDP Debt-to-GDP
PT ATS -0.34 -0.58 -0.11 -0.67
PT ELC -0.07 -0.18 0.13 0.00
PT LTS -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00
PT PEA -0.14 -0.47 0.00 -0.18
ST DIE1 -0.22 -0.52 0.14 -0.23
ST DIE2 -0.52 -1.22 0.26 -0.57
ST FUO -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01
ST KRS -0.23 -0.39 0.37 -0.06
EA HH -0.08 -0.30 0.43 -1.02
ALL -1.32 -3.04 1.04 -2.43
ALL-HH -1.24 -2.75 0.62 -1.42
PT ATS tax -0.66 -0.99 1.86 2.00
PT ELC tax -0.68 -1.48 0.93 0.49
PT LTS tax -0.62 -1.33 0.84 0.49
PT PEA tax -0.74 -1.74 0.80 0.30
ST DIE1 tax -0.82 -1.78 0.87 0.19
ST DIE2 tax -1.09 -2.41 0.88 -0.24
ST FUO tax -0.63 -1.35 0.83 0.49
ST KRS tax -0.82 -1.65 1.07 0.34
EA HH tax -0.69 -1.61 1.25 -0.51
ALL tax -1.83 -4.11 1.51 -2.22
ALL-HH tax -1.76 -3.81 1.09 -1.21
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1.
Moreover, the nominal levels of government transfers to households in the forms of welfare transfers
and pension are indexed to the level of mean wage. In line with the economic activity, the average wage
and thus the levels of transfers decline. Declining total government expenditure improves public savings
and thus allows the government to reduce its debt stock. The largest impact on the debt stock-to-GDP
ratio occurs along the path of EA HH where the real value of the government transfers to households is
cut by 1.9%. At the current level of the carbon tax, removing all fossil fuel subsidies simultaneously has
the highest impact: the level of real GDP will be 1.32% lower in 2030 relative to BaU , and the annual
average growth rate will be 3.273%. The decline in the level of real investment reaches 3%, whereas the
improvements in the trade balance and debt stock to GDP ratios become more prominent.
If the removal of fossil fuel subsidies is accompanied by an increase in the carbon tax, the real GDP
impacts become 0.6 percentage points larger, on average, relative to a no increase in tax scenario. The
higher level of the carbon tax amplifies the price impacts of subsidy removals, Table 7, which hinder the
demand for commodities and thus the level of real GDP. However, the annual average growth rate of real
GDP will be affected marginally: it will drop from 3.3% to 3.278% along the path of ST DIE2 tax and
3.26% along the path of ALL tax. In line with the GDP impacts, the real investment expenditure shrinks
by around 1 percentage point more, on average, compared to ALL. As the higher levels of domestic prices
hinder export demand and increase the import demand, the net exports decline by 0.11%, on average in
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2030, compared to BaU). The decline in nominal GDP suppresses the net export impact, and the net
export-to-GDP ratio improves. The decline in nominal GDP lowers the government commodity demand,
whereas the accelerated domestic inflation amplifies the government transfer expenditures. As a result,
the improvement in the government saving becomes poor and thus the debt-stock-to-GDP-ratio either
increases or decreases at a lower rate, compared to a no increase in tax case.
Excluding the household allowances from the removal process of all fossil fuel subsidies, the sce-
narios of ALL–HH and ALL–HH tax, leads to a lower decline in the level of real GDP by around 13
percentage points, compared to the scenarios of ALL and ALL tax, respectively, and the annual average
growth rate of real GDP drops from 3.3% to 3.276% and 3.264%. In line with the overall economic per-
formance, the real level of investment expenditures declines less. Moreover, the ratios of net-exports- and
debt-stock- to (nominal) GDP improve less, compared to ALL and ALL tax. The reason for the former is
that the exclusion of energy allowances of households leads to higher inflation, Table 7, which, in turn,
lessens the declines in the domestic commodity prices and thus, restricts the Irish firms’ to gain more
competitive power in international markets. Besides, as the higher domestic prices also invoke import de-
mand, the improvement in net exports becomes lower, compared to ALL and ALL tax. The debt-to-GDP
ratio improves less since the government continues to pay the same amount of welfare transfers in real
terms to households, as it does along BaU . The higher level of average wage rate, in line with the overall
inflation, increases the nominal value of transfers and lowers public savings and thus leads to an increase
in the public indebtedness, relative to the scenarios of ALL and ALL tax.
Table 7: Consumer Price Index in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenario Overall Energy Non-energy Scenario Overall Energy Non-energy
PT ATS 0.21 -0.18 0.27 PT ATS tax 0.75 9.60 -0.06
PT ELC -0.07 0.24 -0.09 PT ELC tax 0.48 10.05 -0.41
PT LTS -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 PT LTS tax 0.51 9.72 -0.36
PT PEA 0.11 0.83 0.05 PT PEA tax 0.66 10.65 -0.27
ST DIE1 0.17 2.18 -0.02 ST DIE1 tax 0.80 12.39 -0.29
ST DIE2 0.52 5.60 0.02 ST DIE2 tax 1.26 16.43 -0.17
ST FUO -0.01 0.06 -0.02 ST FUO tax 0.53 9.86 -0.35
ST KRS -0.03 2.86 -0.26 ST KRS tax 0.59 13.04 -0.50
EA HH -0.57 -0.52 -0.57 EA HH tax -0.03 9.29 -0.90
ALL 0.17 8.73 -0.53 ALL tax 0.99 19.94 -0.61
ALL-HH 0.74 9.29 0.03 ALL-HH tax 1.55 20.50 -0.05
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1. The Overall CPI covers all commodities, whereas the Energy
CPI covers only the energy commodities defined in the I3E model; peat, coal, crude oil, gasoline, diesel, kerosene,
fuel oil, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas, electricity, and other petroleum products. Since the commodities
of crude oil and fuel oil are not subject to private consumption, their shares are zero. The Non-energy CPI covers
all except energy commodities.
The average price changes of the energy commodities, which are measured by the energy consumer
price index (CPI), are mainly positive, i.e. the energy inflation is higher relative to BaU , and the removal
of fossil fuel subsidies on diesel and kerosene has the highest impacts across all scenarios. The reason
for the declining energy CPI in the scenario of PT AT S is as follows. According to the SUTs, almost
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60% of the output of the air transportation sector is exported. When the sectoral subsidy is removed, the
cost of production and thus, the price of sectoral output, increases. For the fixed foreign price of the air
transportation commodity, the export of the Irish air transportation sector declines more than the decline
in the sectoral real value-added. In other words, the sector’s supply to the domestic market increases,
which, in turn, restricts the increase in its price due to the removal of the subsidy. The changes in the
non-energy CPI are negligible. Since the total of the weights of the energy commodities in the overall CPI
is around 7%, the changes in the overall CPI are mainly governed by the changes in the non-energy CPI.
In the experiment of EA HH, all CPIs decrease due to the fact that the removal of household allowances
reduces the disposable incomes of the poorest two quintiles in each area of residence and thus lowers their
private demand. Since these quintiles are heavily reliant on welfare transfers, a decline in their disposable
income dampens their consumption expenditures more than other households. If all fossil fuel subsidies
are removed simultaneously, the energy CPI increases by 8.7% in 2030 compared to BaU , whereas the
non-energy CPI decreases by 0.5% and the overall CPI impact is negligible.
In the case of the removal of subsidies with an increase in the level of carbon tax towards 2030, the
energy-CPI impacts vary between 9.3% and 16.4% across the scenarios considered. The higher level
of the sales tax rates of the diesel and kerosene commodities generates the highest increases. In these
scenarios, the non-energy CPI declines, compared to BaU and restricts the change in the overall CPI. In
these scenarios, in line with the pattern of the overall economic activity, higher prices lower final demand
which, in turn, lessens the pressures on the prices. Along the path of ALL tax, the energy CPI increases
by almost 20%, whereas the overall CPI increases by 1% in 2030, compared to BaU . The exclusion of
households’ energy allowances puts upward pressures on all CPIs: since households’ disposable incomes
are not as low as in the cases of ALL and ALL tax scenarios, the private consumption demand does not
decline which, in turn, leads to a higher level of inflation.
6.4 Household Impacts
The removal of fossil fuel subsidies, except the household allowances, at the current level of the carbon tax
(C20 per tonne of CO2) leads to negligible adverse impacts on the real disposable income of household
groups as given in Table 8. The declines in real disposable incomes are in line with the pattern of real
GDP: the removal of subsidies on the diesel commodity has the highest impacts and is followed by the
removal of subsidies on the air transportation and peat sectors and the commodity of kerosene.
On the other hand, the differences between the scenarios of ALL and ALL–HH and ALL tax and
ALL–HH tax indicate that the removal of households’ energy allowances has the highest impact on real
disposable incomes of households. Notice that in the experiment of EA HH, the real value of government
transfers to households is lowered by 1.9%, relative to BaU , and the share parameters of the poorest two
quintiles are lowered. Since the sum of these share parameters must be 1, the share parameters of the
other households are increased. In line with this, the poorest two household groups in urban and rural
areas experience a decline in their disposable incomes, whereas the remaining households’ disposable
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Table 8: Household Real Disposable Income in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenario r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
PT ATS -0.15 -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.23 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.23 -0.24
PT ELC -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
PT LTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
PT PEA -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15
ST DIE1 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.17
ST DIE2 -0.23 -0.24 -0.22 -0.21 -0.30 -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.39
ST FUO -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
ST KRS -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14 -0.17
EA HH -5.09 -2.15 0.45 0.29 0.13 -1.10 -0.20 0.57 0.30 0.04
ALL -5.68 -2.83 -0.22 -0.38 -0.67 -1.68 -0.73 0.00 -0.44 -0.93
ALL-HH -0.59 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.80 -0.58 -0.53 -0.58 -0.74 -0.97
PT ATS tax -0.39 -0.46 -0.46 -0.47 -0.55 -0.39 -0.36 -0.40 -0.51 -0.65
PT ELC tax -0.29 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28 -0.39 -0.29 -0.24 -0.25 -0.34 -0.50
PT LTS tax -0.25 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.34 -0.25 -0.21 -0.22 -0.30 -0.44
PT PEA tax -0.34 -0.37 -0.34 -0.34 -0.45 -0.34 -0.29 -0.30 -0.40 -0.57
ST DIE1 tax -0.34 -0.36 -0.32 -0.33 -0.45 -0.34 -0.28 -0.29 -0.39 -0.58
ST DIE2 tax -0.45 -0.48 -0.43 -0.43 -0.60 -0.46 -0.38 -0.39 -0.53 -0.78
ST FUO tax -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25 -0.35 -0.26 -0.22 -0.22 -0.30 -0.45
ST KRS tax -0.34 -0.37 -0.36 -0.36 -0.46 -0.34 -0.30 -0.31 -0.41 -0.58
EA HH tax -5.34 -2.42 0.21 0.05 -0.21 -1.35 -0.41 0.36 0.00 -0.40
ALL tax -5.88 -3.03 -0.40 -0.56 -0.93 -1.88 -0.89 -0.16 -0.66 -1.27
ALL-HH tax -0.78 -0.88 -0.85 -0.85 -1.06 -0.78 -0.69 -0.74 -0.96 -1.31
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1. The first five columns of households are rural resident
households, and r1 (r5) stands for the poorest (richest) households. The second five columns of households
are urban resident households, and u1 (u5) stands for the poorest (richest) households. For more details, see
Section 4.
incomes increase. The poorest two household groups in rural areas are disproportionately negatively
affected compared to the urban-resident poorest two households.
The joint impacts of the removal of subsidies and the increased carbon tax are all negative due to
the decline in the overall economic activity. However, the magnitudes of the declines in household real
disposable incomes, compared to BaU , are not as high as the decline in real GDP since the real values
of welfare and pension incomes of households are fixed. In other words, the fixed real values of trans-
fer receipts of households allow them to keep their real income unaffected by downturns in the overall
economic activity. In the experiment of EA HH tax, the decline in real disposable income becomes 0.3
percentage points higher, in absolute terms, compared to EA HH. Along the paths of ALL and ALL tax,
the impacts on disposable household incomes are driven by the removal of the household allowances, but
all households experience a decline in their disposable incomes. Except for the poorest two household
groups in both area of residences, the disposable income effects are progressive: the third household
group, namely r3 and u3, are affected less than r5 and u5, respectively.
Along the paths of ALL–HH and ALL–HH tax, all households are getting worse off due to the decline
in overall economic activity, and the impacts across households are n-shaped but slightly progressive
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within each area of residence. Notice that in these two experiments, the share parameters of the richest
three household groups in the total welfare transfers of the government do not increase, relative to ALL
and ALL tax. Therefore, due to the absence of a compensation effect, they are getting more worse off
compared to the scenarios of ALL and ALL tax.
6.5 Welfare and Income Distribution
Changes in household welfare are measured by using the concept of equivalent variation (EV). The con-
cept represents the amount by which consumers have to be compensated in monetary terms for the con-
sequences of a policy change, where the prices used in the comparison are the base-run prices (Vellinga,
2011). EV is based on the changes in the value of expenditure function at base-run prices21 which, in
turn, implies that the changes in EV come from the changes in the volume, i.e. the level of consumption.
Table 9: Equivalent Variation in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenario r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
PT ATS -0.57 -0.69 -0.95 -0.82 -0.86 -0.57 -0.60 -0.84 -0.88 -0.79
PT ELC -0.22 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15
PT LTS -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
PT PEA -0.33 -0.23 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
ST DIE1 -0.59 -0.73 -0.73 -0.81 -0.80 -0.31 -0.35 -0.38 -0.42 -0.49
ST DIE2 -1.35 -1.67 -1.67 -1.84 -1.82 -0.74 -0.82 -0.89 -0.98 -1.13
ST FUO -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
ST KRS -1.85 -1.42 -1.34 -1.11 -1.04 -0.81 -0.72 -0.75 -0.75 -0.64
EA HH -12.42 -5.15 1.25 0.85 0.44 -2.59 -0.37 1.54 0.87 0.24
ALL -16.42 -9.08 -2.71 -2.92 -3.24 -4.92 -2.64 -0.98 -1.77 -2.37
ALL-HH -4.14 -3.97 -3.94 -3.76 -3.68 -2.34 -2.27 -2.51 -2.63 -2.60
PT ATS tax -3.24 -3.29 -3.36 -3.12 -3.03 -2.13 -2.18 -2.42 -2.50 -2.40
PT ELC tax -2.93 -2.85 -2.70 -2.53 -2.43 -1.78 -1.78 -1.82 -1.85 -1.85
PT LTS tax -2.74 -2.68 -2.54 -2.39 -2.29 -1.64 -1.65 -1.70 -1.74 -1.73
PT PEA tax -3.01 -2.87 -2.65 -2.48 -2.35 -1.73 -1.70 -1.73 -1.75 -1.72
ST DIE1 tax -3.22 -3.27 -3.15 -3.05 -2.95 -1.90 -1.95 -2.02 -2.09 -2.13
ST DIE2 tax -3.84 -4.02 -3.92 -3.89 -3.81 -2.28 -2.36 -2.47 -2.59 -2.71
ST FUO tax -2.78 -2.72 -2.58 -2.43 -2.32 -1.66 -1.67 -1.72 -1.75 -1.74
ST KRS tax -4.32 -3.89 -3.68 -3.34 -3.15 -2.33 -2.27 -2.34 -2.37 -2.25
EA HH tax -15.05 -7.80 -1.32 -1.56 -1.85 -4.20 -2.01 -0.16 -0.87 -1.47
ALL tax -18.46 -11.10 -4.65 -4.73 -4.97 -6.28 -4.02 -2.38 -3.19 -3.78
ALL-HH tax -6.25 -6.02 -5.87 -5.56 -5.41 -3.70 -3.65 -3.90 -4.04 -4.01
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1. The first five columns of households are rural resident households,
and r1 (r5) stands for the poorest (richest) households. The second five columns of households are urban resident
households, and u1 (u5) stands for the poorest (richest) households. For more details, see Section 4.
The results given in Table 9 show that in all the experiments, except EA HH, all households are
getting worse off due to lower real consumption which results from both higher commodity prices and
lower real disposable income. Along the path of EA HH, however, the poorest two household groups
21 Technically, EV = e(pbase,U
′
) − e(pbase,Ubase) where base stands for the base-run, U ′ is the level of utility along any
experiment path, and e(.) is the expenditure function.
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face a decline in the levels of their welfare due to declines in their disposable incomes. The remaining
households gain from the policy change and the impact is progressive: as the level of income increases,
the positive impact of the policy change becomes lower. In line with the results in Table 8, the exclusion
of the household energy allowances from the removal process of all fossil fuel subsidies leads to lower
declines in household welfare, especially for the poorest two household groups in each area of residence
as the removal of energy allowances will hit these household groups. On the other hand, the changes in
household welfare are regressive in rural areas: the poorer households are disproportionately adversely
affected by the removal of all subsidies except the allowances of households. The welfare impacts are
n-shaped and progressive in urban areas along the paths of ALL–HH and ALL–HH tax.
Table 10: Between-Group Income Distribution in 2030, percentage change w.r.t. BaU
Scenarios Urban Rural Urban-to-Rural Scenarios Urban Rural Urban-to-Rural
PT ATS -0.09 -0.08 0.02 PT ATS tax -0.27 -0.16 -0.03
PT ELC -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 PT ELC tax -0.21 -0.10 -0.05
PT LTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 PT LTS tax -0.19 -0.09 -0.04
PT PEA -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 PT PEA tax -0.24 -0.11 -0.05
ST DIE1 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 ST DIE1 tax -0.25 -0.11 -0.06
ST DIE2 -0.16 -0.07 -0.04 ST DIE2 tax -0.33 -0.15 -0.08
ST FUO -0.01 0.00 0.00 ST FUO tax -0.19 -0.09 -0.04
ST KRS -0.07 -0.04 0.00 ST KRS tax -0.24 -0.13 -0.04
EA HH 1.15 5.50 0.47 EA HH tax 0.97 5.42 0.43
ALL 0.77 5.31 0.43 ALL tax 0.62 5.25 0.39
ALL-HH -0.39 -0.21 -0.04 ALL-HH tax -0.54 -0.28 -0.08
Note: The list of scenarios is available in Table 1. The term urban (rural) is for the ratio of the richest house-
hold’s real disposable income to the poorest household’s real disposable income in urban (rural) areas. The
term urban-to-rural is the ratio of the sum of real disposable incomes of urban resident households to the sum
of real disposable incomes of rural resident households.
The I3E model, as with all CGE models, is amenable to quantifying alterations only in between-
group income distribution due to the fact that the household sector constitutes representative household
groups rather than individual households. To this end, three indicators to measure changes in the income
distribution are generated. The indicator urban shows the distribution of income between urban resident
households, and it is calculated by dividing the richest household’s real disposable income to the poorest
household. Similarly, the indicator rural is calculated by dividing the rural resident richest household’s
real disposable income by the rural resident poorest households’ disposable income. The last indicator,
urban-to-rural, measures the distribution of disposable income across urban and rural areas and it is
calculated by dividing the sum of urban resident households’ real disposable incomes by the sum of
rural resident households’ real disposable incomes. Figures in Table 10 are the percentage changes in
these indicators relative to BaU . For these indicators, a positive value implies a deterioration, whereas a
negative value means an improvement in the between-group income distributions.
The results indicate that the removal of subsidies individually except the household allowances im-
proves all three between-group income distribution indicators within both areas of residences. The im-
pacts on the distribution of income across areas of residence are negligible. If the removal of all subsidies
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is accompanied by an increase in the carbon tax, the magnitudes of improvements become more promi-
nent. On the other hand, the removal of household energy allowances negatively affects the between-
group income distribution and the impact is much larger in rural areas relative to urban areas as the rural
poorest households are more dependent on welfare. Along the path of EA HH, the income distribution
between urban and rural areas changes in favour of urban areas. The removal of all households also leads
to increases in all three indicators, but the magnitudes are lower than those of EA HH as the removal
of other subsidies also has negative impacts on the richest households’ disposable incomes. However,
with the removal of all subsidies with the exclusion of the household allowances, the between-group
income distribution changes in favour of the poorest households in both urban and rural areas, and the
improvement is greater in rural areas.
7 Conclusion
Carbon taxation is the most cost-effective way of reducing emissions, since it induces behavioural changes
in economic agents. However, due to its disproportionately negative impacts on poorer households in the
absence of appropriate policy design, there is opposition to an increase in the carbon tax, notwithstand-
ing increasing awareness of climate change. In addition to carbon taxation (or environmental taxes in
general), governments are implementing several policies regarding shifting power production and trans-
portation from fossil fuel-based technologies to cleaner energies, increasing energy efficiency, etc. On the
other hand, several governments, including the Irish government, also conduct various fossil fuel subsidy
schemes to support certain sectors, commodities, or households. Ironically, the budgetary cost of these
subsidies is much larger than the environmental tax collections in many country cases. This phenomenon
implies that governments actually have a wider fiscal space in the alleviation of the adverse climate
change impacts by removing these subsidies rather than levying new environmental taxes or increasing
the existing environmental tax rates/levels.
This report analyses the economic and environmental impacts of removing eight different subsidy
schemes in the case of Ireland, where the budgetary cost of these subsidies is over six times higher than
the entire carbon tax revenue of the government. The results indicate that the removal of each of these
subsidies has negligible impacts on overall economic activity and household welfare. The exception is in
the case of removing household energy allowances, whereby the poorest two household groups in both
urban and rural areas are affected negatively in terms of the level of real disposable income and welfare.
When the subsidy removal process is combined with an increase in the carbon tax, there are even larger
adverse impacts on the economic figures and household welfare.
The emissions results reveal that if all subsidies are removed, the non-ETS CO2 emissions will decline
by 11.7% in 2030. If the subsidy removal process is accompanied by an increase in the carbon tax, the
decline in the non-ETS CO2 emissions will be 18.4%. However, these figures are not sufficient to help the
country meet its legally-binding targets for 2030. Under the assumptions that the agricultural non-CO2
emissions will be realised as projected by the EPA and there will be no changes in other policies, the
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non-ETS emissions will be 1.5 times higher than the target. The joint impacts of the removal of subsidies
and increasing carbon tax is also not sufficient to meet the target: the level of non-ETS CO2 emissions
will be more than one-third higher than the target for 2030. The emissions results clearly show that
neither carbon taxation nor removing environmentally damaging fossil fuel subsidies is a viable options
by itself to reduce emissions. These policies must be supported by other environmental policies such
as electrification of transportation, increasing the share of renewables in power-generation, increasing
energy efficiency via retrofitting activities, etc. It should be noted that in order to reduce the possible
opposition of the sectors to removing these subsidies, the government may direct this funding to the same
sectors to encourage and subsidise their green investment expenditures to reach the low-carbon economy
target. The I3E model is in the process of development in order to be able to analyse some of these policy
options.
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Appendix A Lists of Activities and Commodities
Table A.1: Commodities
AGR Agriculture BFM Basic metal manufacturing
PEA Peat HTP High-technology products
COA Coal TRE Transportation equipment
CRO* Crude oil ELC Electricity
OMN* Other mining products NGS Natural gas supply
FBT Food, beverage and tobacco WAT Water and sewerage
TEX Textile CON Construction
WWP Wood and wood products TRD Trade
OIN Other industrial products LTS Land transportation
GAL Gasoline WTS Water transportation
KRS Kerosene ATS Air transportation
FUO* Fuel oil ACC Accommodation and hotel services
LPG Liquid petroleum gas TEL Telecommunication services
DIE Diesel FSR Financial services
OPP Other petroleum products RES Real estate services
OTM Other manufacturing PUB Public services
CHE Chemicals and chemical products EDU Education sector
BPP Basic pharmaceutical products HHS Health sector
RUP Rubber and plastic products SER Other services
ONM Other non-metallic products
*: Not subject to private consumption.
35
Table A.2: Activities
Activity NACE Codes Aggregate Sector
ACC Accommodation & hotel services 55–56,79 ACC
AGR Agriculture 1-3 AGR
CON Construction 41–43 CON
ELC Electricity ELC
FSR Financial services 64–66,77 FSR
PUB Public sector 84 PUB
TRD Trade 45–47 TRD
BFM Basic metal manufacturing 24–25 MAN
Manufacturing
BPP Basic pharmaceutical products 21 MAN
CHE Chemicals and chemical products 20 MAN
FBT Food, beverage and tobacco 10–12 MAN
HTP High-technology products 26–28 MAN
NGS Natural gas supply MAN
OIN Other industrial products 17,18,33 MAN
ONM Other non-metallic products 23 MAN
OTM Other manufacturing 31–32 MAN
PET Petroleum MAN
RUP Rubber and plastic products 22 MAN
TEX Textile 13–15 MAN
TRE Transportation equipment 29–30 MAN
WAT Water and sewerage 36,37–39 MAN
WWP Wood and wood products 16 MAN
OMN Other mining products MIN
Mining
PEA Peat MIN
ATS Air transportation 51 TRP
TransportationLTS Land transportation 49 TRP
WTS Water transportation 50 TRP
EDU Education sector 85 SER
Services
HHS Health sector 86–88 SER
RES Real estate services 68 SER
SER Other services remaining* SER
TEL Telecommunication services 61 SER
*: It excludes NACE codes 5-9 (Mining, Quarrying and Extraction), 19 (Petroleum Products),
and 35 (Electricity and Gas Supply).
Note: The activities without NACE codes are further disaggregated sectors.
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